India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) marks a significant strategic pivot, particularly in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack. This move suggests a recalibration in New Delhi’s approach to leveraging transboundary water flows as a means of applying pressure on Pakistan. With the treaty constraints now lifted, India appears poised to assert greater control over river waters, fast-track hydropower projects, and reduce bilateral cooperation on water management—developments that could pose substantial risks to Pakistan’s agriculture, energy, and economic stability.
The suspension will likely impact regulated water releases from the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—which, under the IWT, were largely reserved for Pakistan. While natural river flows will persist, India could halt regulated discharges from major hydropower facilities like the Kishanganga and Ratle Dams. This would directly affect Pakistan’s access to irrigation water during peak agricultural seasons, potentially leading to reduced crop productivity.
India is expected to prioritize and accelerate work on strategic hydro projects. The operational 330 MW Kishanganga Dam and the 850 MW Ratle Dam currently under construction may undergo redesigns to enhance water storage capacity or modify downstream flows—changes that have previously drawn strong objections from Pakistan. Additionally, India is likely to maximize usage of its full entitlement from the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—by ramping up infrastructure projects such as the completed Shahpurkandi Dam and the proposed Ujh Dam. These efforts could substantially curtail the estimated 9.3 billion cubic meters of surplus water that currently flows into Pakistan annually.
Alongside these physical developments, India is also expected to cut off data-sharing mechanisms with Pakistan. This includes the suspension of real-time water flow data and the denial of Pakistani inspection teams access to Indian hydro facilities—measures that would further exacerbate mistrust and reduce transparency.
Key dams at the center of this shift include Kishanganga on the Jhelum River, which diverts water from a crucial Mangla Dam tributary; the Ratle project on the Chenab, poised to restrict flows to Pakistani Punjab; the Shahpurkandi Dam on the Ravi, which redirects water to Indian irrigation systems; and the upcoming Ujh Dam, also on the Ravi, which could further limit downstream water access for Pakistan.
In response, Pakistan is considering legal and diplomatic countermeasures. These include appealing to international bodies like the International Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration—though India now disputes their jurisdiction due to the treaty’s suspension. Islamabad may also seek World Bank intervention, as the original IWT broker, and rally support from allies such as China and members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). However, broader retaliatory actions like trade or diplomatic disruption may be limited by Pakistan’s ongoing economic constraints.
The implications for Pakistan are profound. Agriculture, which accounts for nearly 80% of irrigated land relying on the Indus system, may face significant disruptions. Crop yields for staples like wheat, rice, and cotton could decline, threatening food security and GDP growth. In response to diminished surface water, increased reliance on groundwater could accelerate aquifer depletion and exacerbate land salinization.
Pakistan’s power sector may also suffer. Hydropower generation from key facilities like Tarbela and Mangla—which provide nearly 30% of the nation’s electricity—could drop due to lower river inflows. This may intensify energy shortages and strain an already struggling grid.
Economically, the ripple effects could be wide-ranging. Lower agricultural yields may lead to job losses in rural areas, spike defaults on farming loans, and drive migration to urban centers, straining infrastructure in cities like Lahore and Karachi. Meanwhile, soil degradation, already affecting 43% of Pakistan’s arable land due to salinity, may worsen and push the country toward long-term desertification.
Inter-provincial tensions could also flare up, particularly under the fragile framework of the 1991 Water Accord. As water availability shrinks, disputes among Pakistan’s provinces may resurface, complicating governance and regional coordination.
Finally, a reduction in water availability could impact Pakistan’s export economy. Agricultural exports such as Basmati rice and cotton-based textiles—critical for earning foreign exchange—may decline, weakening the rupee and worsening trade deficits. While switching to more water-efficient crops like millets is an option, challenges related to infrastructure, farmer training, and market access could delay meaningful adaptation.
